


# REASSESSING THE EU'S LNG IMPORT EXPANSION

Geopolitical Dependencies, Energy Security,  
and Climate Goals after the Russian Invasion  
of Ukraine

IAEE Paris 2025

Johannes Giehl, Flora v. Mikulicz-Radecki, Maike Kalz, Mathilde Roger  
CSEI and TUB-ER




Adobe Stock by Mike Mareen

# The energy crisis showed the vulnerabilities of Europe's Energy System

Analysis of gas supply combining network modelling with policy analysis

- Geopolitical tensions put a spotlight on security relevance of energy policy
- Expansion of LNG terminals to ensure short-term supply.
  - Member states fast-tracked LNG terminals with public investment and regulatory flexibility
  - Capacity rose from 2,780 to 3,480 TWh/a by 2024.
- Expansion risks fossil lock-in and EU's climate goals
- South-East Europe remains vulnerable due to limited interconnection, energy poverty, and fewer alternatives to Russian gas
- The study evaluates whether LNG expansion was/is necessary and how it affects regional resilience—particularly in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe—




# How to evaluate the LNG expansion and the impact on supply

## Gas Network Modelling

- **Pre-2022 literature**
  - Focused on Europe's vulnerability to Russian gas supply disruptions
  - Emphasised the need for infrastructure development, including LNG and pipelines [1-5]
- **Recent studies**
  - Examine trade-offs between energy security and climate goals
  - Findings showing LNG and Caspian pipeline gas can replace the Russian supply [6-7]
- **What's new?**
  - Updated and higher resolution of regional data
  - Focus on Eastern European countries

## Energy Poverty and Eastern Europe



Household natural gas versus at-risk-of-poverty rate by Bouzarovski et al. (2015)

# Five scenarios to analyze supply security, affordability, sustainability

A qualitative analysis based on the gas network model results

## ▪ Security of Supply [8-13]:



- Reduction of dependence on Russia
- Introduced new geopolitical and infrastructural vulnerabilities

## ▪ Affordability [14-19]:




- Global markets access but higher price volatility
- Capital-intensive infrastructure is, with the risk of stranded assets and uneven regional investments

## ▪ Sustainability [8, 21-24] :




- LNG's lifecycle emissions
- Long operational lifespan of LNG terminals risks carbon lock-in
- Diversion of resources from renewable alternatives



⊘ excluded    📁 Only via TurkStream    ⬇️ Partly interruption

# The European Gas Infrastructure in context of global gas transportation



Mixed Integer Linear Programming to identify cost optimal global supply



Cost Component	Value	Unit
LNG shipping cost	0.0805	€/GWh/km
Liquefaction cost	8530.35	€/GWh
Regasification cost	8530.35	€/GWh
Panama Canal fee	2217.89	€/GWh
Suez Canal fee	950.00	€/GWh
Pipeline transport cost	1.71	€/GWh/km
Pipeline investment cost	0.51	€/GWh/km/year
Production Cost	Regional Value	€/GWh

# National nodes and net transfer capacities represent Europe's gas grid


From pre-war over the current expansion to 2035 LNG infrastructure





# A Fragile Foundation for Gas Security with High Risk and Low Flexibility

Reference Scenario (2021)



- Supply **reliant on Russian pipelines**; full independence not feasible.
- **Limited flexibility** and severe chokepoints (e.g. NO-DE/NL, NL-DE, FR-ES).



- Price stability based on **fragile assumptions** (uninterrupted Russian flows).
- No structural overinvestment, but **regional imbalance** limited system efficiency.
- **Lack of integration reduced cost-effectiveness**; supply could not flow to where it was most needed.



- Emissions relatively low due to **pipeline dominance** (incl. Russian gas).
- **No demand reduction**, no LNG lock-in yet, but no decarbonisation cushion either.




- Full dependence on **Russian gas**, especially in Southeast and Northeast.
- **No LNG access in Finland**, limited diversification options.

- Severe **infrastructure constraints** (e.g. limited interconnectors to the West).
- **High vulnerability** to supply shocks and price volatility.

# Crisis-Driven Resilience with Secured Supply, Uneven Outcomes

Realized Expansion Scenario (2024)



- Fully **secured supply** despite the loss of Russian gas.
- **High LNG flexibility**, but overcapacity in peripheral terminals (ES, PT, TR).
- **Security driven by demand reduction**, not infrastructure.



- Moderate price effects; **Central and Eastern Europe** benefit from expanded infrastructure.
- Some **LNG terminals underutilised** → risk of sunk costs.



- Emissions decline **driven by demand-side reduction**.
- **Overcapacity** risks future fossil lock-in.




- **Supply secured**, but regional stress persists.
- Poland & Baltics **heavily rely on LNG**, terminals near capacity.
- **Southeast limited by grid**, dependent on Turkish inflows.

- **Slight price relief** in PL/UA, but energy poverty remains structurally unresolved.



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


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# Norwegian Pipeline Loss Strains the System

Realized Expansion Scenario (2024) with interruption of pipeline gas flows from Norway



**Supply remains secure** but system is more stressed.

- Loss of Norwegian pipeline flows **increases reliance on LNG**, especially in DE and PL.
- More **complex rerouting and higher utilisation** of southern corridors.



**Mixed economic effects.**

- Slight **price increases** in NL, ES, Southeast Europe due to loss of pipeline advantage.
- Greater burden on LNG import infrastructure raises **cost volatility**.



- Higher LNG share **increases lifecycle emissions** slightly.
- Loss of Norwegian pipeline gas (low GHG intensity) **worsens carbon footprint regionally**.




- Increased LNG **burden on DE/PL infrastructure**.
- Southeast faces **price rise** due to rerouting and longer supply chains.
- Vulnerability to **pipeline loss** with limited fallback option.

- Confirms **pipelines are more effective** for Eastern Europe than LNG expansion.

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
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# Efficiency Through Integration – Better Balance Without Expansion

Alternative Resilience Scenario (2024) with targeted investment in the infrastructure



- Security **comparable to LNG expansion.**
- **Relieves bottlenecks** in Eastern Europe.
- **Improves system balance and routing flexibility.**



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- **Less LNG** use reduces lifecycle emissions.
- Aligns better with **EU climate goals.**
- **No additional lock-in** from new terminals.




- Internal pipeline reinforcements **improve eastward flow**, especially via Poland.
- **Stress on LNG terminals in Eastern Europe decreases**, as pipeline capacity absorbs more volume.
- More **balanced gas distribution**, lower regional congestion.
- **Prices fall or stabilise** in Eastern and Southeastern Europe.
- Confirms that **pipeline investment is more effective** than LNG expansion for regional resilience.

# Efficiency Through Integration – Better Balance Without Expansion

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Cost difference between  
Scenario 2 and 3



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


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# Stable System with Persistent Structural Imbalances

Planned LNG Expansion Scenario (2035) with demand from the IEA Stated Policies Scenario



- **Supply secured**, but regional disparities remain.
- Overcapacity coexists with stress in Eastern Europe.



- **Prices fall** in most regions, but less so in the East.
- Overbuilt LNG terminals lead to **sunk cost risk**.



- **Emissions decline** only moderately.
- Stated policies **insufficient for deep decarbonisation**.
- **Lock-in risk remains** high due to long-term LNG contracts.




- Supply secure, but Eastern Europe sees **limited price relief**.
- **Grid fragmentation** limits access to unused LNG capacity.
- **Infrastructure stress** persists in PL, Baltics, Southeast.

- **Energy poverty unchanged**; price drops don't reach vulnerable groups.
- **Reveals inequality in access and utilisation**, despite EU-wide capacity surplus.



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# The analysis highlights the need for spatially, integrated planning

## Limitations & Conclusions

- **Model focus**

- Calculation on annual level does not show operational bottlenecks
- No consideration of full market behaviour and long-term contracts
- Cost estimates are simplified
- Assumes rational infrastructure use up to 100% per year
- No factors such as politics, delays or social opposition

- **The effects of global emissions**

- Simplified assessment uses averages for the whole of Europe
- No scenario with endogenous minimisation
- Hydrogen and long-term repurposing options not covered

- **Energy poverty and Eastern Europe**

- Effects are discussed qualitatively based on regional access and price signals
- No economic analysis based on current data

- **Reducing demand is crucial for achieving**

- energy security
- affordability and economic efficiency
- Sustainability

- **Supply without any Russian gas in Europe is possible**

- LNG ensured short-term supply and increased resilience
- LNG expansion created regional disparities, overcapacity and risks of fossil lock-in

- **Reinforcing the pipeline provides more balanced outcomes**


- Reaching emission reductions
- Cost-efficient supply and transition

- **Eastern and Southeastern Europe**

- Remains structurally disadvantaged
- Benefit more from internal infrastructure coordination than from global LNG markets

Johannes Giehl, Flora v. Mikulicz-Radecki, Maike Kalz

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# The Gas Infrastructure Model

Single time step deterministic cost minimization

## Objective:

- Minimize total cost of gas supply

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Min} \quad & \sum_{(i,j) \in E} x_{ij,Commodity} * c_{var,ij,Commodity} \\ & + x_{ij,Commodity} * c_{trans,ij,Commodity} \\ & (+ new_{ij,Commodity} * c_{new,ij,Commodity}) \end{aligned}$$

## s.t:

- Kirchoff's 1<sup>st</sup> law

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{(i,j) \in E} x_{ij,commodity} - \sum_{(k,i) \in E} x_{ki,commodity} \\ = S_{i,commodity} \end{aligned}$$

- Capacity Constraint

$$x_{ij,commodity} \leq cap_{ij,commodity}$$

## Variables:

- $x_{ij,Commodity}$  = flow per edge
- $new_{ij,Commodity}$  = new capacity per edge

## Parameters:

$S_{i,commodity}$  = Demand / Supply at node i

$cap_{ij,commodity}$  = Capacity of edge i,j for

$c_{var,ij,Commodity}$  = production cost of edge i,j

$c_{new,ij,Commodity}$  = construction cost of edge i,j for each commodity

$c_{trans,ij,Commodity}$  = transportation cost of edge i,j

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- The Gas Infrastructure Model will be available soon open source: Giehl et al. (2025): CSEI's Gas Infrastructure Model, [https://github.com/CSEI-EU/gas\\_infrastructure\\_model](https://github.com/CSEI-EU/gas_infrastructure_model) using the Branch IAEE\_Paris\_2025 for the data of the presentation.